Comment on Structure and Theory by Hall, Jerome
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1976
Comment on Structure and Theory
Jerome Hall
University of California, Hastings College of the Law*
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Law
Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hall, Jerome, "Comment on Structure and Theory" (1976). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 1456.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1456
COMMENT ON STRUCTURE AND THEORY
Jerome Hall
I should like to raise two questions about the new German Code
and then discuss what seem to me to be the most important require-
ments of a criminal theory.
First, there is the often repeated claim that the new Code is based
on fault (Schuld) in a moral sense. But German law relies rather
heavily on inadvertent negligence as a sufficient ground of penal lia-
bility. This question has been widely discussed in Anglo-American
journals,' and only two brief comments will be made. The late Pro-
fessor Turner's statement: "it should now be recognized that at com-
mon law there is no criminal liability for harm thus caused by inad-
vertence, ' 2 representing centuries of thoughtful decisions by very able
judges and applied even in cases where many deaths were caused by
the defendant, must surely raise a doubt regarding the claim that
harms caused inadvertently involve moral culpability, indeed, such a
high degree of moral culpability that it should be dealt with by the
imposition of punitive sanctions. It is true, of course, that American
scholars disagree on this subject as do English scholars; in this discus-
sion I only suggest that the claim that the new German Code is based
on moral fault is debatable. Later, I shall discuss the reasons for
thinking that the acceptance of inadvertent negligence handicaps the
construction of a theory of penal law.
Before doing that may I note that § 46(1) of the new Code states
that the offender's guilt is the measure of his punishment. It is only
necessary to refer to assault and criminal attempt to see that this
claim should be qualified by reference to the harms actually commit-
ted (or not committed) by equally culpable offenders. It is important,
I think, to recognize the difference between a legal system that limits
guilt by taking account of the harm committed and a moral philoso-
phy focused solely on guilt.
I come now to the question of "penal theory," which represents
knowledge of criminal law. It will be granted that the common ob-
jective of scholars of criminal law is to maximize that knowledge. It
will also be granted, I trust, that the peak of scientific knowledge is
found in mathematics and in physics. In both sciences there are very
clear, definite concepts-the product of the work of generations of spe-
cialists in those sciences. Correspondingly, the respect in which Ger-
man penal scholarship is universally held testifies to the thoroughness
and profundity characteristic of its elucidation of the basic concepts
1. Hall, "Negligent Behavior Should be Excluded from Penal Liability,"
63 Colum. L. Rev. 632 (1963), cites some of -the discussions of this problem.
2. Turner, Kenny's Outline of Criminal Law 34 (1962).
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of that law. What is lacking, I suggest with deference, and what dis-
tinguishes current penal theory from science, is the failure to interre-
late the basic concepts in a significant pattern. The importance of
such interrelation cannot be exaggerated.
Although there must be differences between a science of criminal
law (if and when such a science exists) and physical science, there are
common attributes of both enterprises even if they do not exhaust
the respective fields and leave some problems, say of criminal law,
to be explored by other methods. These features are the interrelation
of the concepts of a theory and their final reference to or "reduction"
to a few basic categories. The literature on the philosophy of science
is replete with evidence of this age-old quest for "the one among the
many." "Science," said Einstein, "searches for relations. . . ."; he em-
phasizes "its coherent systems."'3  Perhaps such a system is implied
in German cases and treatises on penal law just as it can be derived
from the rich case law of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence and
its classical treatises; but implication is not the articulation of a theory
and its use.
There is, of course, a logic in the relation of the General Part
to the Special Part, but it is far short of a classification based on avail-
able knowledge; in addition, the General Part is indiscriminate not
only in its inclusion of jurisdictional rules but, also and more impor-
tantly, in its confusion of types of propositions that should be distin-
guished, namely propositions which qualify the Special Part and wider
propositions which are derived from the union of the above two types
of propositions; these last comprise the basic or ultimate concepts of
penal law, its "categories" or "principles."
I can elucidate the meaning of these statements if I describe
briefly the theory of criminal law I constructed some years ago. I
distinguish "rules," "doctrines" and "principles" of criminal law, terms
that represent progressively wider concepts. Thus, the rules specify
what is distinctive in each crime, and they also describe the specific
mental states of the respective actors without reference to justification
or excuse. Those "normal" meanings must be qualified by other, more
general propositions, e.g. those concerning infancy, insanity, mistake,
coercion, necessity and so on, propositions which I have called "doc-
trines." Among the "doctrines," in addition to the above references
to "excuse" and "justification," are propositions concerning complicity,
solicitation, conspiracy and attempt, i.e. doctrines that qualify "harm."
When all the doctrines are applied as qualifiers to all the rules, the
criminal law of any country is stated. But in advanced legal systems
there is an additional feature that must be recognized; indeed, by ref-
erence to a science of criminal law, this is the most important feature
of all. Thus, if one surveys the union of all the rules and all the
doctrines with a view to discovering the basic ideas that are implied
by that combined set of propositions, one may derive from that combi-
3. Quoted in Readings in the Philosophy of Science 779 (eds. Feigl and
Brodbeck, 1953).
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nation the ultimate categories, the principles of criminal law, namely
legality, mens rea (Schuld), effort (or "act" but not in the sense of
"conduct"), the fusion of mens rea with effort (or act) to comprise
conduct, the harm, the causal relation between conduct and harm, and
the punitive nature of the sanction.
I have pointed out the general interrelation of the rules, doctrines
and principles-that the rules remain incomplete until the doctrines
are added to them and that the principles represent the ultimate cate-
gories to which the diverse elements of the rules qualified by the doc-
trines are referred and reduced. We may now take a closer look at
some of these interrelations. For example, the principle of mens rea
is derived from all the relevant doctrines (e.g. insanity, mistake) and
also by reference to the normal significance of the mens rea described
in the rules. A defendant frequently does not plead an excuse or jus-
tification; he simply denies that he did what he is charged with doing.
If he is found guilty, his mens rea is that expressed in the rules minus
the doctrines, i.e. he was a sane adult, knew the facts, did not act
in a state of necessity or in a condition of excuse, and so on. It should
be added that while the principles are "ultimate" concepts, they must
be distinguished from the simple uniformity characteristic of chemical
elements. For example, mens rea is a composite of cognition and voli-
tion (e.g., an intention to . . .), and the fact that mens rea qualifies
the other principles implies that these latter concepts also are not sim-
ple ones. The principle of causation links conduct to harm. But "cau-
sation" is also qualified by the meaning of mens rea; and if, as I prefer,
mens rea is limited to intentionality and recklessness, i.e. to mental
states expressed in voluntary conduct, that determines the meaning
of "causation." Again, mens rea qualifies "harm"; it is not simply
a death or a loss of possession that is a harm in penal discourse, but
a death or loss of possession caused voluntarily by a sane, sober adult
without justification or excuse. So too harm, on the one hand, must
be related to mens rea to define the latter concept; e.g. it is intending
to or recklessly committing a proscribed harm (not mens rea in isola-
tion) that determines its meaning. On the other hand, harm as the
bridge between voluntary misconduct and punishment qualifies the
meaning of the latter concept. The principle of legality serves as the
formal vehicle to place definite bounds on all concepts and proposi-
tions of penal law. In sum, since the principles are interrelated, they
accumulate the relevant contextual meanings; and they are "ultimate"
in view of their role in the system, i.e. their relation to the doctrines
and the rules. I trust I have sufficiently described the principal con-
cepts of a theory of penal law and some of their interrelations to sup-
port the claim that they comprise a system of ideas and that the goal
of scientific inquiry in any field has in a measure been satisfied.
There are additional points about mens rea (Schuld) that are rel-
evant to the present inquiry. For example, it is said or implied in
essays by our German colleagues that Schuld is not just the intention
to kill or harm, etc.; it also includes blameworthiness or knowledge
that the conduct is wrong. Now if that means that the defendant
1976]
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must actually know he is acting in an immoral way, the statement
is certainly questionable. Quite apart from offenders' frequent ration-
alization of their criminal conduct, it is clear that conscience some-
times errs. If the above statement means that in addition to intention-
ality there must be blame, and blame in the sense of actual knowledge
of wrong is excluded, what does the statement mean? Plainly, if one
knows only that a certain act was intentional, he is in no position
to make any judgment of blame; to do that, one must find the defend-
ant guilty of causing a proscribed harm and, also, exclude the doctrines
of excuse and justification.
There are other aspects of German law regarding Schuld that puz-
zle a common lawyer, apart from the inclusion of motives in the def-
inition of some crimes. Suppose a sane, sober adult, not mistaken re-
garding the relevant facts and so on, grew up and lives in a marginal
group, a "sub-culture"; he practices plural marriage or, belonging to
the "Peculiar People" and reading the Bible literally, he is convinced
that for the true believer even the bite of a rattlesnake is not harm-
ful, and he holds one which bites a nearby person. Or, as is more fre-
quent, the marginal person believes that taking property from the rich
is not wrong; instead, it is a just distribution of wealth.
It is unrealistic to assume that if he had "consulted his conscience,"
as German law seems to require, he would have discovered that
his conduct was immoral. Accordingly, the modern judge in any ad-
vanced country faces a dilemma. On the one hand, he believes the
above actions are immoral and that this view is commonly shared.
On the other hand, he is an advocate of subjective guilt, and if this
means that every defendant in a criminal case must actually know
that his conduct was immoral, that bars criminal liability. The Ger-
man solution seems to be to invoke "inadvertent negligence," but the
Code may not include a relevant provision.
American law, with the unfortunate exception of the law on homi-
cide, has also moved in the direction of subjective guilt, though not
as definitely as has English law. But in England and the United
States there are at least two aspects of the penal law that are not
subjective, one of which is that the values expressed in that law must
be treated as objective. (The other is the principle of legality which
I shall discuss in a later Comment.) Instead of indulging in the fiction
that the defendant's conscience would have guided him correctly had
he consulted it, and instead of searching for a basis of penal liability
in strained views of inadvertent negligence, the law of these countries
allocates the above problem to the sphere of administration, where
probation, suspended sentence or a minimum sentence may be appro-
priate. As regards both German and Anglo-American law, there is
no escape from the fact that punitive sanctions are sometimes imposed
on persons who actually did not know and could not have known that
they were acting immorally. The meaning of "subjective guilt" should
be limited to accord with the objectivity of the values expressed in
[Vol. 24
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a sound body of criminal law. The sanction, mitigated to suit the
facts, can be defended on educational grounds applicable to voluntary
harmdoers who know the facts, but not to inadvertent harmdoers
whose behavior does not directly or deliberately challenge society's
values.
I submit that the lack of a systematic theory results in deficiencies
in analysis and I shall discuss them more fully in later comments.
At this point it is important to note that the above theory of penal
law and the general thrust of Anglo-American law employs a contex-
tual approach to the analysis of penal problems while German analy-
sis proceeds in three stages. To a common lawyer, this mode of analy-
sis, focused first on Tatbestand, then on legality, and finally on
Schuld, resembles, but also differs from, the common lawyer's prima
facie case. Even if both methods represent a defensible procedural
approach, they do not constitute a theory of penal law. In the German
method, when Tatbestand has been qualified by legality, the implica-
tion is the "possibility" of criminal conduct; but since that "possibil-
ity" is determined by reference to Schuld, it ("possibility") is only
a half-way house; actually, when the analysis has been completed, it
turns out that there is no such thing as possibility-conduct is either
criminal or it is not criminal, and the erection of "possibility" as a
third class is superfluous, if not misleading. It is not surprising that
this sort of analysis has stimulated a considerable literature on Tat-
bestand.
This is not the place for a detailed demonstration of the signif-
icance of the contextual theory or of comparison of analysis based on
it with other methods of analysis. But I should like to call attention
to the fact that the above system of ideas or propositions comprises
a descriptive theory which was made possible by the restriction of
mens rea to intentionality and recklessness, i.e. to what is common
in the states of mind manifested in the voluntary commission of the
specific crimes. In this respect English law and treatises evolved from
a moral to a positivist posture. Hale's 17th-century Pleas of the
Crown was based on the voluntary commission of harm.4 Bentham,
in the 18th century, dulled any substantive difference between civil
and criminal sanctions; they were all simply "evils." And Stephen,
in the 19th century, influenced by the diversity of the mental states
represented in the commission of various crimes, opted for mentes
reae, and that became standard in English law and treatises. As Lord
Atkin put it, the criminal law should be based on a moral foundation
but obviously morality and criminal law do not always coincide. This
may have been good judging but it did not represent scientific think-
ing.
The German Penal Code, as previously noted, purports to be based
on moral fault, yet it often relies on inadvertent negligence that, pre-
4. 1 Hale 14, 42.
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sumably, is regarded as a moral fault. Thus, on the one hand, while
English criminal law and theory terminated in the simplicism that
the violation of any law carrying a punitive sanction is criminal law
or relied on a procedural criterion to distinguish it from civil law (lack
of control of prosecution), German law and theory sought to provide
a moral foundation for criminal law. The difficulty is that the ac-
ceptance by German theorists of inadvertent negligence as a sound
basis of criminal liability bars the way to valid generalization and thus
to systematic theory. The point here is not the validity of judgments
regarding negligence; as stated, on that question scholars are divided
in common-law countries. The present point is that inadvertent negli-
gence is the contrary of the states of mind designated "intentional"
or "reckless"; it is not characteristic of "voluntary conduct." Accord-
ingly, a concept of mens rea or Schuld that includes these diverse
states of mind includes contraries or contradictions; it is a confused
concept, not a description of what is uniform among those states of
mind. That same confusion infests the concepts or principles of harm,
causation and punishment; and it plainly invalidates a theory that
purports to be "finalistic," i.e. end-seeking. The difficulty cannot be
overcome by treating negligence as a type of actual fault, implying
that it is congruent or identical with the kind of fault found in volun-
tary misconduct. A descriptive theory is validated by reference to
the facts, and the judgment that negligence is a moral fault does not
annul the sharp differences among the states of mind designated by
Schuld.
The problem thus presented to the theorist of criminal law is like
that which besets any scientist who is bound to adhere to the actual
uniformity of the data that are the subject of his laws and theories.
One need not be a physicist to know that wave theory, quantum the-
ory and other physical theories are partial theories; they explain some
but not all the data, i.e. what physicists recognize as the data to be
explained. Nonetheless, the fact that physicists make very significant
use of those theories should encourage theorists of criminal law who
are also insistent on a moral basis of penal liability, to construct sys-
tems that, while they may be only partial (as regards the Code), are
nevertheless illuminating as far as they go. It is equally important
to distinguish methods of analysis and the need in that procedure to
consider one point at a time and in a rational order from a theory
of penal law.
